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MICttlE, Wiley, New York, 1972. 
In the fall of 1973, I was presented with the latest in a series of volumes 
on machine intelligence dited by Bernard Meltzer and Donald Michie at 
Edinburgh University (Machine Intelligence 7, Wiley, New York, 1972). 
At this time I was teaching an M.I.T. seminar entitled "Automating Knowl- 
edge Based Programming and Validation using Actors." The members of 
the seminar agreed that it would be interesting and useful to produce a 
critical review of some of the more prominent papers in the volume. I collected 
together the best of the critiques into the following review. Although I do 
not agree with all of the opinions expressed in these critiques, I believe 
that they are all professionally and intellectually respectable. 
"Utterances as P rograms"  
D. J. M .  DAVIES AND S. D. IS~RD 
Davies and Isard's paper discusses the loose analogy between human 
understanding of natural language and computer "understanding" of 
programming languages. Most of the paper applies the distinction between 
"compilation" and "execution" to selected examples of natural language use. 
The basic analogy hinges on the distinction between understanding an 
utterance and actually carrying it out. Further the point is made that these 
phases are intermixed. The hearer of an utterance may be "executing" 
part of it (such as resolving noun-group referents) while still "compiling" 
(parsing) the rest. 
The authors use of this compile/execute distinction is not entirely clear, 
because while they consider all knowledge to be represented by procedures 
(as in PLANNER), they fail to distinguish among the various ways a given 
piece of knowledge may be used (executed). Indeed, one might well consider 
noun-reference r solution as a further phase of compilation, rather than as 
execution. 
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They use number names (e.g., “three hundred million seven hundred”) 
to show that execution (understanding) often proceeds during compilation 
(parsing) not just as a guide to eliminate ambiguous parsings. Rather, no 
parse of the whole utterance is produced, but just the value (300,000,700) 
which is after all the only thing of interest in this case. 
Several other examples bearing on the “computer as hearer” analogy. 
The paper is very readable, and brings up some fascinating points. However, 
it does not seem to succeed in clarifying the loose analogies to a point where 
they are very useful for talking concretely about natural language, or computer 
languages. 
RICHARD GROSSMAN, KENNETH KAHN, AND RICHARD WATERS 
“An Approach to the Frame Problem, and Its Implementation” 
E. SANDEWALL 
In his paper, Erik Sandewall attempts to deal with the Frame Problem, 
which he defines as the problem of proving which properties are held by 
various objects in an environment after they have been subjected to a known 
sequence of actions. He introduces the Unless operator, which seems to be 
defined: If A is a sentence, then Unless(A) is true if and only if A cannot be 
proven from the available data. The Unless operator has two properties 
that mean that Sandewall is abandoning the Predicate Calculus as anything 
but a notational device (a fact which he explicitly recognizes): 
The extension property no longer holds. If a theorem is true in a theory T, 
and is dependent on some Unless clause, then the addition of certain new 
axioms may make that theorem false. 
He also presents an example in which the theoremhood of two statements 
seems to oscillate, and claims that he may be forced to accept a three-valued 
logic where a sentence must be one of the following: a theorem, not a theorem, 
or undetermined. 
Sandewall indicates that his Unless operator bears a strong resemblance 
to the MICRO-PLANNER primitive thnot, but claims that there are signifi- 
cant differences. In fact there are differences in the rules of inference available 
to the two operators, but they both are attempting to capture the same 
idea, and thnot seems to do a better job. He certainly did not adequately 
